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Abstract: By adopting social exchange theory and the affect-infusion-model, the hypothesis is made that emotional 
intelligence (EI) will have an impact on three perceptions of trustworthiness – ability, integrity and benevolence – at the 
beginning of a relationship. It was also hypothesized that additional information would gradually displace EI in forming 
the above perceptions. The results reveal that EI initially does not contribute to any of the perceptions of trustworthiness. 
As more information is revealed EI has an impact on the perception of benevolence, but not on the perceptions of ability 
and integrity. This impact was observed to be negative when the nature of the information was negative. On the other 
hand, information alone was shown to have a significant impact on the perceptions of ability and integrity, but not on the 
perception of benevolence. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are addressed. 
Keywords: Affect, emotional intelligence, social exchange theory, trust. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Emotional intelligence (EI) has attracted much attention 
since Goleman published his book titled “Emotional 
Intelligence” in 1995. EI has been found to help people cope 
with stress [1], live healthier lives [2, 3], and enjoy a higher 
degree of social quality [4]. The role of EI in workplace and 
leadership research has also been an important topic [5-9]. 
For instance, trust has been found positively related to job 
performance and negatively related to counterproductive 
behaviors, such as absenteeism or intentions to resign [10-
12]. It has also been seen as an effective tool to counter the 
expectation of opportunistic behavior and to lower 
transaction costs [13]. In fact, recent research has found that 
both trust and EI positively contribute to the performance of 
managerial relationships in the banking industry [14]. 
 Then, is there any relationship between EI and trust? 
What researches have agreed upon so far is that emotions 
can affect trust [12, 15-18]. EI, which comprises skills such 
as acknowledging and managing emotions, is therefore 
considered a key to establish trust [19]. However, how EI 
can contribute to the formation of trust is an issue that rarely 
has been explored. It is still unknown whether a high-EI 
individual is more inclined to trust or whether a high-EI 
individual is better equipped to project a trustworthy image, 
or both. In this paper we will initially investigate the 
relationship between trustworthiness and EI. We try to 
develop a conceptual framework to explain the relationship 
between EI and trustworthiness by the inclusion of social 
exchange theory [20] and the affect-infusion model [21]. 
From this framework we propose a number of hypotheses. 
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These hypotheses are then tested on data collected through 
an experiment. The final results will be discussed in detail.  
SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY 
 Blau’s [20] social exchange theory explains how trust 
between two people evolves. Social exchange is defined as 
an individual’s voluntary actions that are motivated by the 
returns he or she expects to elicit from others. The exchange 
is a slow process and a person initiates this process by 
offering small favors to another individual. Such small 
favors may induce an obligation to the latter party to return 
some favors. If the latter party returns what the first party has 
expected, the latter party demonstrates trustworthiness. 
Further, then trust can be reinforced through regular 
discharge of obligation and gradual expansion of exchanges 
over time [22]. 
 To keep the social exchange process continuing, one 
needs to overcome a number of uncertainties which do not 
exist in an economic exchange transaction [23]. In an 
economic exchange transaction, both parties normally 
stipulate in advance of the transaction their individual rights 
and obligations, time-frame of fulfillment, as well as the 
consequences of violation. However, all these items remain 
vague to each party in a social exchange transaction. In a 
social exchange transaction, it is not easy for one to know 
what constitutes an appropriate and equitable return to a 
received favor. Appropriateness and equity can only be 
judged in the eyes of the initiator [20]. There might be some 
commonly accepted practice for returning favors, such as 
when a supervisor offers a meal for staff members who have 
done extra work. However, individual difference in response 
to a return may still exist. To tackle individual difference, 
especially at an early stage of a relationship in which no 
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prior record can serve as a guideline, one needs to discover 
the other party’s intentions through other clues. 
 Clues can come from a number of non-verbal behaviors, 
which include head-nodding, eye-contact, gestures, tone and 
voice, etc [24]. These behaviors might be a manifestation of 
a person’s internal emotional state such as happiness, apathy, 
frustration or poignancy. The ability to establish the link 
between emotional states and behaviors will give a person a 
better chance of discharging his or her obligations under a 
social exchange transaction, and thus exhibiting his or her 
trustworthiness [20]. 
THE AFFECT INFUSION MODEL 
 Trustworthiness, on the other hand, can be viewed as a 
judgment one needs to make about another party in a 
relationship. According to Forgas’ [21] affect-infusion-
model a judgment can be formed by adopting one of four 
strategies: direct access, motivated processing, heuristic 
processing and substantive processing. Two of these four 
strategies are influenced by affects, which include both 
moods and emotions. For instance, affects have a little role 
to play in forming a judgment under a direct access strategy. 
A direct-access strategy means that a person reaches a 
judgment based on his or her pre-existing and stored 
evaluations of the latter party. This strategy requires little 
elaboration [25]. For example, it is unlikely for a secretary to 
ruminate his or her boss’s trustworthiness after working 
together for ten years. Another strategy, motivated-
processing, is used when a person is under strong 
motivational pressure to achieve a particular outcome. Such 
motivational pressure and achievement desire are so strong 
that he or she will not allow his or her affective state to 
influence his or her judgment. An example is that an 
interviewee is unlikely to allow his or her mood to color his 
or her judgment during a job interview. 
 The remaining two strategies are influenced by a 
person’s moods and emotions. A heuristic-processing 
strategy means that a person simply deduces his or her 
judgment from current affective states [6]. When he or she 
feels good, his or her judgment tends to be positive and vice 
versa. However, it has been argued that in a complex 
organizational context, this strategy is seldom adopted [25]. 
If uncertain and unpredictable social encounters are 
prevalent, one may adopt a substantive-processing strategy 
[26]. Substantive-processing means that an individual needs 
to elaborate extensively. During the elaboration process 
affect is likely to infuse into the judgment. For example, 
when a new manager negotiates with the head of another 
department about the division of responsibility in a project, 
the new manager might not possess enough information 
about the other party’s trustworthiness. Since the decision is 
important, he or she might try to make a best conjecture 
based on the association of information available with his or 
her own experiences. Positive experiences are then more 
likely to be retrieved and interpreted favorably when he or 
she is in good moods, and vice versa.  
 Three of the above four strategies are claimed to be 
related to the judgment of trust: heuristic-processing, 
substantive-processing and direct-access [16]. One might 
adopt a heuristic-processing strategy or a substantive-
processing strategy to appraise a target person’s 
trustworthiness when the latter party is a complete stranger. 
Whichever strategy is chosen, the decision will be influenced 
by one’s affective state. However, as one gets to know a 
target person better, a judgment will be made through direct-
access strategy, in which affects play a small part. 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 The affect-infusion model indicates that moods affect an 
individual’s judgment subconsciously under a heuristic or a 
substantive-processing strategy. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to postulate that an individual may alter others’ 
judgments through recognizing and skillfully handling their 
emotions and moods [6, 25, 26]. High-EI people normally 
possess such an ability [8, 27, 28]. This leads us to believe 
that the presence of high-EI individuals might speed up the 
formation of a trustful relationship. 
 However, what constitutes EI has still been subjected to 
disputes. At present, there are different models and measures 
of EI. One common way to categorize EI is the division 
between ability-based EI [29] and trait-based EI [30-32]. The 
ability-based model is adopted in this paper for three 
reasons. First, previous researches have shown that trait-
based EI, unlike ability-based EI, has excessive overlap with 
standard personality traits such as the Five-Factor Model 
[33-35]. By adopting a trait-based model, it will be difficult 
to identify what eventually contributes to the final outcomes: 
personality or emotional skills. Second, it has been pointed 
out that trait-based EI is too encompassing [36]. As a result, 
Goleman has already included trustworthiness under the 
component of self-management within his EI model [31]. 
Why such a component has been included in the EI model in 
the first place is incomprehensible [34]. The ability-based 
model, on the other hand, restricts itself to only emotions and 
intelligence-related aspects. It is therefore more meaningful 
to investigate whether the relationship between emotional 
abilities and trustworthiness really exists than to simply 
cluster them as a single construct. Third, research has also 
indicated that the self-report questionnaire used in trait-based 
models is more vulnerable to social desirability than is the 
expert and general-consensus based questionnaire used in the 
ability-based model [37]. Consequently, results will be more 
reliable if the measurement itself is less likely to be 
subjected to manipulations. 
 The ability-based model of EI, as defined by Mayer and 
Salovey [29], involves four abilities: [1] the ability to 
accurately perceive and express emotions; [2] the ability to 
generate feelings to assist thinking; [3] the ability to 
understand emotions and their progression; and [4] the 
ability to regulate and manage emotions. Here, the term 
emotion is equivalent to the term affect, which includes both 
moods and emotions, as used in the affect infusion model 
[21]. 
 These abilities have been found helpful in certain 
organizational settings. For example, EI has been found to be 
positively correlated with organizational commitment and 
conflict resolution [38]. Additionally, Carmeli and Josman 
[39] have discerned that supervisors’ ratings of employees’ 
altruism are positively related to employees’ EI. It is 
therefore likely that organizational commitment, conflict 
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resolution, and altruism might have some connection with 
trust. 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 The formation of a trust relationship depends both on a 
trustor’s tendency to trust and the trustworthiness of a 
trustee. The two are nonetheless interrelated. If a trustee is 
not regarded as trustworthy, a trustor’s tendency to trust will 
be low. What then makes a trustor believe that a trustee is 
trustworthy? Butler [40] has discovered ten conditions of 
trustworthiness: availability, competence, consistency, 
discreetness, fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise 
fulfillment, and receptivity. These ten conditions have later 
been combined into three antecedents of trust: ability, 
integrity and benevolence [41]. Since then, these three 
antecedents of trust have been widely adopted in the trust 
literature [42]. Empirical research has shown that ability, 
benevolence and integrity are all significantly and positively 
related to trust [43, 44].  
 Nevertheless, it might be concluded that trustworthiness 
only can be ascertained after all these described behaviors 
become apparent [22]. If this is the case, trust between two 
parties can only be created after a certain period of time. 
However, it has been discovered that even before the actual 
behaviors are exhibited, a mere display of trustworthy 
signals could enhance the image of trustworthiness. For 
example, the simple inclusion of a statement of privacy 
policy or unconditional-money-back guarantee on a website 
could increase the probability of a purchase, even though the 
statement has not been verified [45]. Many organizational 
policies, such as delegation of authority or procedural 
justice, contribute to the creation of trust. This is partly due 
to the affective component inherent in these policies [46-48]. 
They enhance the trust of staff members partly because these 
members feel they are respected by the organization [22]. 
This means that by appealing to a trustor’s feelings, a trustee 
might look more trustworthy than others. Elsbach [49] has 
further proposed that a person can polish others’ perception 
of his or her trustworthiness through appropriate self-
disclosure, choice of language and facial expressions. 
Moreover, in a qualitative study of the physician-patient 
relationships, researchers have discovered that physicians’ 
dispositions impact on a patient’s inclination to trust [50]. 
Patients tend to place more trust in physicians who exhibit 
eye-contact or attentive listening than in physicians who do 
not. This indicates that a person may polish his or her image 
of trustworthiness through sensitively selecting facial 
expression or body language. 
 Perhaps the counseling literature has shown the most 
striking evidence. A person can garner trust from others 
before actual incidents of ability, integrity and benevolence 
become apparent. Lee, Uhlemann [51] have shown that from 
the clients’ standpoint, counselors’ facial expression, head 
nod, voice, gesture, smile, speech, posture and eye-contact 
account for fifty-five percentage of the variance in their 
trustworthiness rating. Another study has also discovered 
that clients give more favorable ratings to a counselor who 
exhibits high levels of eye-contact, direct body orientation, 
and leaning forward [52]. Furthermore, the time period 
during which clients form their trust opinion is relatively 
short and it ranges from only ten to twenty minutes [51, 52]. 
HYPOTHESES AND STUDIES 
 The main interest of this paper is to explain the 
interaction between a person’s EI and others’ perception of 
his or her trustworthiness through the application of social 
exchange theory [20] and the affect-infusion model [21]. 
Social exchange theory [20] predicts that in the beginning of 
a relationship, a person can demonstrate his or her 
trustworthiness by catching non-verbal signals and 
responding appropriately. High-EI individuals are those who 
are sensitive to emotional clues underlying non-verbal 
signals. They are also more competent than low-EI 
individuals in understanding the signals and in displaying 
appropriate facial expressions. Accordingly, they have a 
better chance than low-EI individuals in projecting a 
trustworthy image to others. The affect infusion model [21], 
on the other hand, provides the link between affects and 
judgment. An individual will judge an unknown person’s 
trustworthiness through affect-infused strategies such as 
heuristic or substantive-processing. High-EI individuals are 
those who are well-versed in managing others’ emotional 
states; therefore, they are better equipped than low-EI 
individuals to influence another person’s formation of 
judgment of trustworthiness during the affect-infused stage 
of processing. These could be the reasons for why counselors 
who demonstrate gestures such as a head nod, a smile and 
eye-contact attract more trust from clients than those who do 
not [51, 52]. We are going to describe in detail how EI can 
affect each of the perceptions of trustworthiness: ability, 
benevolence and integrity in the remainder of the paper.  
HYPOTHESIS 1 - ABILITY 
 According to Mayer et al. [41], ability is defined as a 
group of skills that a person possesses in a specific domain, 
which is the same as competence in one of Butler’s [40] ten 
conditions. A supervisor’s group of skills, for example, 
could be difficult for a new employee to assess accurately. 
The new employee may then seek other clues. One of them 
could be his or her supervisor’s confidence at work. A 
physician’s display of confidence when expressing medical 
opinions has been considered by patients as a clue about his 
or her competence [50]. Similarly, when a supervisor faces a 
crisis but is able to remain calm and composed in dealing 
with the task at hand, it might project an image of 
confidence. This image of confidence might in turn varnish 
others’ perceptions of his or her ability. In fact, even under 
normal conditions, a person probably needs to overcome 
anxiety and fear in order to demonstrate his or her ability 
confidently in the face of strangers. High-EI individuals are 
those who are highly aware and good at understanding and 
managing negative feelings. They are therefore more likely 
than low-EI individuals to display confidence.  
 Alternatively, a subordinate’s current state of moods and 
emotions may also have an impact on his or her judgment of 
the supervisor’s ability because of affect-infused strategies 
adopted at the early stage of a relationship. Under this 
condition, if the supervisor is able to acknowledge the 
affective state of his or her subordinate, understand the 
causes, and change his or her mood from negative to neutral 
or even positive, it is likely that the subordinate’s perception 
of the supervisor’s ability will be improved. In fact, a similar 
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actual case has been described by Caruso, Bienn [8]. Here, a 
manager had noticed her new subordinate’s discomfort by 
observing his facial expression, quavering tone, and nervous 
tapping of fingers. She then discussed with him and 
pinpointed the reasons behind the nervousness and pacified 
his anxiety.  
 H1a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI 
person to be perceived as competent when others possess 
little information and evaluation about him or her. 
 As the relationship progresses, people will nonetheless 
change their way of forming trustworthy perceptions. Social 
exchange theory [20] forecasts that as more social exchange 
take place, people will view the other party’s trustworthiness 
based on how well the other party has reacted to signals in 
the past. The affect infusion model [21] alternatively 
suggests that people’s strategy of making judgment of 
trustworthiness shifts from heuristic or substantive 
processing to direct access processing as more information 
about the target person is revealed. In other words, people 
tend to retrieve past experience and evaluations, rather than 
other clues, to form a judgment about another person’s 
trustworthiness. The judgment process becomes quick and is 
seldom influenced by their affective status. In the trust 
literature, it has been described that people’s perceptions of 
trustworthiness will eventually depend on the actual 
behavioral exchanges and incidents of trustworthiness [15, 
41, 42, 53]. At this stage, it seems that a high-EI individual 
does not have much advantage over a low-EI individual to 
change another persons’ judgment concerning him or her.  
 Accordingly, we propose that people will form a 
perception of another person’s ability based more on facts 
than on feelings when more information is unveiled. For 
example, after certain periods, a subordinate may 
accumulate, directly or indirectly, more knowledge about his 
or her supervisor’s true abilities. He or she will then adjust 
his or her initial trust with regard to the updated information. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is the following: 
H1b: As more information and experience about the other 
person is obtained, one will judge the other person’s ability 
based on the information and experience, independent of EI.  
METHOD FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 
Participants 
 Thirty business school students from the Norwegian 
School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) 
were recruited as participants. Of these, six students were 
given the role of actors, while the other twenty-four were 
given the role of assessors. Actors were given instructions on 
how to play the games and each actor would be assigned to 
play against ten to twelve assessors on different days and 
times. Assessors played the games as strangers and assessed 
the trustworthiness of actors. Three of the six actors had 
taken the MSCEIT, which is an online EI test that adopts the 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso ability-EI model [54], before the 
experiment was held and the other three took the MSCEIT 
online after completion of the experiment. Of the six actors, 
two were female and four were male. Their average age was 
23.17. Of the twenty-four assessors, nine were female and 
fifteen were male. Their average age was 23.13. All 
assessors and actors were debriefed about their roles after the 
end of the experiment. 
Materials 
MSCEIT 
 We used the online version of MSCEIT [54] for this 
study. It consists of four EI branches and each branch has 
two different tasks. The four EI branches include perceiving 
emotions, facilitating thoughts, understanding emotions and 
managing emotions. Their respective split-half reliabilities 
reported in the manual (Mayer et al., 2002) are r =.91, r 
=.79, r =.80 and r =.83. The overall reliability for total EI is 
r =.93. 
Experimental Condition 1 
 This paper-based game contains two parts. In the first 
part there is a Sukodu game together with the rules of play. 
In the second part there is a question asking the players to 
rate how much each of them believes the other party can 
finish another Sukodu game within three minutes (11 points 
Likert-type scale; 0 means not believe; 10 means strongly 
believe), provided with the information that in general fifty 
percent of people can finish it within three minutes. Another 
much easier Sukodu game is then followed. 
Experimental Condition 2  
 This paper-based game contains three parts. It is the same 
as the game in experimental condition 1 except that the 
stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part. 
The stimulus consists of a Sukodu game which is easier than 
that of the first part but more difficult than that of the last 
part. The stimulus is intended to give the player more 
information about the other party’s ability. 
Procedures 
 Actors were given briefing sessions on how they should 
play each game one week before the experiment was actually 
to take place. They were also given the names of the 
assessors in order to ensure they would not play against 
someone they had already known. During the games, the 
actors were told to pretend to be other assessors and not to 
disclose their true identities as actors. Except for some 
specific instructions that we mention in the following 
sections, they were told to behave as naturally as possible. 
 Assessors were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions. Each assessor would not play 
against an actor more than once.  
RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 
 We first investigated the correlation between assessors’ 
perceptions and actors’ EI. In Table 1, we discerned in the 
complete-stranger condition (experimental condition 1) that 
assessors’ perception of actors’ ability did not correlate 
significantly with actors’ EI. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was 
not supported. In order to overcome the small sample size, 
we also carried out a non-parametric test. We first divided 
the actors into two equal-sized groups: the high-EI and the 
low-EI group. The high-EI group consisted of actors who 
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scored more than 100 marks; whereas low EI group 
consisted of actors who scored lower than 100 marks. 
According to the MSCEIT manual, the mean score is 100 
marks [54]. Building on this group division, a Mann-
Whitney U test did not reveal any significant difference in 
the assessors’ perception of actors’ ability between the high-
EI (Md=3.0, n=12) and the low-EI group (Md=4.5, n=12), 
U=15.5, z=-0.88, p = 0.93, r = 0.02 under this condition. 
This again indicated that Hypothesis 1a was not supported. 
 Focusing on Hypothesis 1b, an independent-sample t-test 
showed a significant difference in the assessors’ perception 
of actors’ ability between complete-stranger (experimental 
condition 1) (M=4.08, SD=2.94) and additional-information 
condition (experimental condition 2) (M=1.60, SD=1.58), 
t(17)=2.52, p=0.022 (two-tailed). The magnitude of the 
differences in the means (Mean Difference=2.48, 95% CI: 
.41 to 4.6) was also large (Eta Squared = 0.24). The 
presence of more information through the additional Sudoku 
game significantly lowered the assessors’ ratings of the 
perception of actors’ ability. Thus, Hypothesis 1b was 
supported. We also carried out a non-parametric test in order 
to overcome the impact of a small sample size. The Mann-
Whitney U test also showed a significant difference in the 
assessors’ perception of actors’ ability under the complete-
stranger (Md=3.0, n=22) and the additional-information 
condition (Md=1.5, n=22), U=28.0, z=-2.17, p=0.03, r=0.46. 
This provides additional evidence that Hypothesis 1b was 
supported. 
DISCUSSION FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 
 Pertaining to the perception of ability, our results showed 
that overall EI scores did not have any significant impact on 
the perception rating under both experimental conditions. 
Contrary to our prediction as described in hypothesis 1a, we 
found that high EI individuals did not have an advantage 
compared with low EI individuals in bestowing a competent 
image on another party. On the other hand, we discovered 
that additional information significantly affected the 
perception rating of ability. We therefore concluded that 
additional information did play a vital role for a person to 
reach a perception judgment. In fact the above results 
conformed to the claim that perception of ability is cognitive 
[28, 55], which means that the perception is formed based on 
trustworthy or untrustworthy acts, rather than one’s affective 
state. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 - INTEGRITY 
 Integrity means that a trustor believes that another party 
will adhere to a set of principles that the trustor finds 
acceptable [41]. The definition encompasses five conditions 
proposed by Butler [40]: consistency, promise fulfillment, 
fairness, discreetness and integrity. Nonetheless, it will be 
very difficult to find out what principles a trustee will adhere 
to at the very beginning of a relationship. Hoping to discover 
leakages about another party’s seriousness or laxity 
concerning certain principles, a trustor might search clues 
such as tone, voice or facial expression from the other party. 
These leakages might then constitute an initial perception of 
integrity. Knowing the importance of the initial perception, a 
high-EI individual might be more careful in expressing his or 
her emotions. Also, the ability to perceive and understand 
emotions enables a high EI individual to be more alert to 
others’ expression of doubts and the ability to manage 
others’ emotions assists him or her to handle the doubts 
adeptly. For example, high-EI individuals may be better than 
low-EI individuals in stipulating a promise with 
determination and in clarifying when the other party shows 
perplexity. Therefore, our first hypothesis concerning the 
perception of integrity is as follows: 
 H2a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI 
person to be perceived as a person of integrity when others 
possess little information and evaluations about him or her. 
 However, the initial assessment of integrity formed is 
unlikely to last. Additional information is likely to be treated 
as a test for the initial assessment; that is, people might 
adjust the initial assessment upwards or downwards based on 
the other party’s behaviors. Gradually, actual behaviors will 
displace the initial assessment and constitute the foundation 
of a new perception. At this point, the new perception is 
unlikely to be influenced by another person’s EI. 
Consequently, we have the following hypothesis concerning 
the perception of integrity. 
Table 1. Correlations between perception scores and emotional intelligence scores. 
Experimental conditions Actors’ 
overall 
emotional 
intelligence 
Actors’ 
ability to 
recognize 
emotions 
Actors’ 
ability to 
use 
emotions  
Actors’ 
ability to 
understand 
emotions 
Actors’ 
ability to 
manage 
emotions 
1. Assessors’ perception of actors’ ability without additional information -0.008 0.074 0.229 -0.284 -0.064 
2. Assessors’ perception of actors’ ability with additional information 0.451 0.167 -0.120 0.730b 0.252 
3. Assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity without additional information 0.341 0.510 0.378 0.098 0.044 
4. Assessors’ perception of actors’ integrity with additional information 0.275 0.372 0.136 0.185 -0.114 
5. Assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence without additional information -0.254 -0.362 0.321 -0.437 0.009 
6. Assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence with additional information -0.746a -0.337 -0.597b -0.442 -0.245 
aCorrelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
bCorrelation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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H2b: As more information and experience about the other 
person is revealed, one will judge the other person’s integrity 
based on the information and experience, independent of EI.  
METHOD FOR HYPOTHESIS 2 
Participants 
 The same participants were used for testing Hypothesis 2 
as for assessing Hypothesis 1. 
Materials 
Experimental Condition 3  
 This paper-based game contains two parts. The first part 
requests the two players to make an agreement on how much 
they will share with each other if one of them becomes the 
winner of the Kr.1000 lucky draw. In the second part there 
are questions asking each player to state whether he or she 
will honor the agreement and to rate how much he or she 
believes the other party will honor the agreement in part 1 
(11 points Likert-type scale; 0 means not believe; 10 means 
strongly believe). 
Experimental Condition 4  
 This paper-based game contains three parts. It is the same 
as the game in experimental condition 3 except that a 
stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part. 
The stimulus consists of a ten-time prisoner’s dilemma game 
(PDG). The stimulus is intended to give the player more 
information about the other party’s behaviors. 
Procedures 
 In experimental condition 3, both the assessor and the 
actor were asked to complete the first part in about ten 
minutes. They were told that they needed to share at least ten 
percent with another party. After five minutes, they were 
asked if they needed more time to reach agreement; if yes, 
they were given another five minutes. The actor had been 
instructed in the briefing to agree with the other party’s 
suggestion, and if the other party did not make any 
suggestion, the actor would propose thirty percent. After the 
first part, they were separated and were unable to see each 
other. They were then requested to complete the second part 
and were informed that their answers would not be shared 
with their opponents. They were also assured that the 
identity of the one who finally won the lucky draw would 
not be revealed. 
 In experimental condition 4, the steps were the same as 
those in experimental condition 3 except the inclusion of ten 
PDGs. In this stimulus part, they were told that they could 
get an extra bonus if they cooperated nine times out of ten, 
and the bonus amount would be doubled if, for at least one 
game, one of them did not cooperate but the other party did. 
The amount of bonus, however, was not stated. In the 
briefing, the actor had been instructed to cooperate until the 
tenth game in which the actor was instructed to choose not to 
cooperate. For the first nine games, the actor had been 
instructed to cooperate unless the opponent chose the 
opposite. When the opponent did not cooperate, for example, 
in the second PDG, the actor then had to choose not to 
cooperate in the third PDG until the opponent chose to 
cooperate again. As a result, no one was able to get the 
double-bonus.  
RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 2 
 Two observations were invalid as the actors did not 
follow the instructions. For the remaining observations, we 
found that assessors’ perception did not correlate 
significantly with actors’ EI under the complete-stranger 
condition (experimental condition 3). Hypothesis 2a was 
thus not supported. In line, the Mann-Whitney U test did not 
indicate any significant difference in the assessors’ 
perception of actors’ integrity between the high-EI (Md=8.0, 
n=11) and the low-EI group (Md=8.5, n=11), U=12.0, z=-
0.39, p=0.70, r=1.17 under this condition. On the other hand, 
we did receive support for Hypothesis 2b. An independent-
sample t-test revealed a significant difference in assessors’ 
perception of actors’ integrity between the complete-stranger 
(experimental condition 3) (M=7.64, SD=2.46) and the 
additional-information condition (experimental condition 4) 
(M=4.09, SD=2.95), t(20)=3.06, p=0.006 (two-tailed). 
Again, the magnitude of the differences in the means (Mean 
Difference=3.55, 95% CI: 1.1 to 6.0) was large (Eta Squared 
=0.32). Moreover, the Mann-Whitney U test also revealed a 
significant difference in assessors’ perception of actors’ 
integrity between the complete-stranger (Md=8.0, n=22) and 
the additional-information condition (Md=3.0, n=22), 
U=23.0, z=-2.49, p=0.01, r=0.53. Hypothesis 2b was 
supported. 
DISCUSSION FOR HYPOTHESIS 2 
 Pertaining to the perception of integrity, we discovered 
similar results as in the perception of ability. Again, EI did 
not have any significant impact on the perception under both 
experimental conditions. However, additional information 
again did significantly affect the perception rating. These 
findings also supported the claim that perception of integrity 
is also cognitive in nature [28, 55]. However, there existed 
some subtle differences in the impact of additional 
information between perceptions of ability and of integrity. 
The mean perception rating of integrity under a complete-
stranger condition represented a moderate level of trust. The 
mean perception rating was then reduced to a modest level of 
distrust, after the inclusion of ten PDGs. The drop was not 
only significant but also shifted from the trusting region to 
the distrusting region. This result was important in the sense 
that the PDGs themselves had little to do with the promises 
in the beginning of the experiment since the two parties were 
given no opportunity to discuss how to play the PDGs. It 
agreed with the claim that initial trust is fragile [56]. The 
results might also be due to the fact that the ten PDGs arouse 
the risk awareness of the assessors. Olivero and Lunt [57] 
have discovered that risk awareness reduces the level of 
trust. Overall, it implied that one may even speculate another 
party’s integrity through the latter’s unrelated actions. 
HYPOTHESIS 3 – BENEVOLENCE 
 Benevolence has been defined as a trustee’s intention to 
do good to a trustor, without egocentric profit incentive [41]. 
This definition comprises four of Butler’s [40] ten 
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conditions: loyalty, openness, receptivity and availability. In 
other words, the trustor believes that the kindness shown by 
the trustee is intrinsically motivated, rather than out of 
extrinsic rewards [58]. To judge whether a complete 
stranger’s kindness is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated 
is never easy. Under uncertainty, one may form a judgment 
simply relying on the atmosphere that surrounds an 
interaction. The atmosphere is more likely to be amiable 
when one can feel the other party’s empathy and care. 
Empathy has been found to be significantly and positively 
related to one’s EI [59, 60], possibly due to a high-EI 
individual’s ability to identify and understand emotions. 
Also, high-EI employees have been found to be more altrusic 
than low-EI employees in the eyes of their supervisors [39] 
Therefore, our hypothesis concerning EI and benevolence is: 
 H3a: A high-EI person is more likely than a low-EI 
person to be perceived as a person of benevolence when 
others possess little information and evaluations about him 
or her. 
 Similar to the cases of ability and integrity, we predict 
that the importance of empathy on the perception of 
benevolence will fade when more information becomes 
available. This could be due to two reasons. First, an 
individual will shift his or her decision making strategy from 
heuristic or substantive processing to direct access; the same 
as in the cases of ability and integrity. Second, if additional 
information reveals that the trustee is not as benevolent as an 
individual originally thought, the individual’s feeling will be 
hurt and the bitter feeling may offset the original favorable 
feelings. Therefore, our last hypothesis is: 
 H3b: As more information and experience about the 
other person is obtained, one will judge the other person’s 
benevolence based on the information and experience, 
independent of EI.  
METHOD FOR HYPOTHESIS 3 
Participants 
 The same participants were used for testing Hypothesis 3 
as for assessing Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Materials 
Experimental Condition 5 
 This paper-based game contains two parts. The first part 
requests the two players to state how they would spend 
Kr.500 000 if someone gives it to each of them and requires 
each of them to spend the whole sum within one week. In the 
second part they are informed that one-fifth of the 
participants will be chosen to give half of his or her 
endowment to the other party and the other party can choose 
to accept the money or return it to the original owner. There 
are questions asking each player to state whether he or she 
will accept the money if the other party is chosen and to rate 
how much he or she, if chosen, believes the other party will 
return the money (11 points Likert-type scale; 0 means not 
believe; 10 means strongly believe). 
Experimental Condition 6  
 This paper-based game contains three parts. It is the same 
as the game in experimental condition 5 except that the 
stimulus is inserted between the first and the second part. 
The stimulus consists of a ten-time prisoner’s dilemma game 
(PDG) which is the same as in experimental condition 4. The 
stimulus is intended to give the player more information 
about the other party’s behaviors. 
Procedures 
 In experimental condition 5, both the assessor and the 
actor were asked to complete the first part in about ten 
minutes. They were each given an amount of Kr.40 as initial 
endowment for this game. After five minutes, they were 
asked if they needed more time to reach agreement; if yes, 
they were given another five minutes. In the briefing, the 
actor had been instructed to tell the other party that ten 
percent of the Kr.500 000 would be given to a charity. After 
the first part, they were separated and were unable to see 
each other. They were then requested to complete the second 
part and they were informed that their answers would not be 
shared with their opponents. 
 In experimental condition 6, the steps were the same as 
those in experimental condition 5 except that the stimulus of 
the ten-time PDGs was added. All the procedures for the ten-
time PDGs were the same as those in experimental condition 
4. 
RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 3 
 Relating to the actors’ benevolence, no significant 
correlation was found between assessors’ perception and 
actors’ EI under the complete-stranger condition 
(experimental condition 5). In support of this finding, the 
Mann-Whitney U test did not indicate any significant 
difference in assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence 
between the high-EI (Md=4.0, n=12) and the low-EI group 
(Md=7.0, n=12), U=12.0, z=-1.12, p=0.26, r=0.32. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a was not supported. When looking 
at Hypothesis 3b, the difference in the assessors’ perception 
of actors’ benevolence between the complete-stranger 
(experimental condition 5) (M=5.75, SD=2.49) and the 
additional-information condition (experimental condition 6) 
(M=4.33, SD=3.39) was insignificant, t(22)=1.17, p=0.256. 
The Mann-Whitney U test also agreed to the fact that there 
was no significant difference in assessors’ perception of 
actors’ benevolence between the complete-stranger (Md=6.5, 
n=24) and the additional-information condition (Md=4.0, 
n=24), U=55.0, z=-1.00, p=0.32, r=0.20. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3b was not supported.  
DISCUSSION FOR HYPOTHESIS 3 
 Pertaining to the perception of benevolence, we got a 
somewhat different picture. Unlike the perceptions of ability 
and integrity, here we found no significant difference 
between the means under two conditions. It means that the 
additional information did not make any impact on the 
perception of benevolence. 
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ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
 We continued to investigate whether the perception 
scores were independent of EI when additional information 
was available. By looking at their correlations under the 
additional-information conditions (experimental conditions 
2, 4 and 6) (Table 1), we discovered two unexpected results. 
First, there was a moderately significant relationship 
between actors’ ability to understand emotions and 
assessors’ perception of ability rating under the additional-
information condition, although the relationship between 
overall EI and the rating remained insignificant. Second, 
actors’ EI was found to be significantly correlated with 
assessors’ perception of actors’ benevolence under the 
additional-information condition. The Mann-Whitney U test 
also indicated significant difference in the assessors’ 
perception of actors’ benevolence between the high-EI 
(Md=2.0, n=12) and the low-EI group (Md=8.0, n=12), 
U=5.0, z=-2.05, p=0.04, r=.60 under the additional-
information condition (experimental condition 6). 
 This was an explorative result because of not only the 
significance involved but also the negative relationship 
shown. It meant that high EI individuals scored significantly 
lower than did low EI individuals in terms of benevolence-
based trustworthiness when some negative information about 
those individuals was disclosed to the other party. 
 We then conducted a regression analysis to see how well 
actors’ EI scores predicted their benevolence-based 
trustworthiness at the presence of negative information 
(Table 2). The model showed that the EI scores significantly 
predicted the benevolence-based trust score, F=12.52, 
p=0.005. The adjusted R squared value was .51, which 
indicated that 51% of the variance in benevolence-based 
trust was explained by the model. It also showed that the 
coefficient of EI was significant (p=0.005). Assumptions of 
linearity, normally distributed errors, and uncorrelated errors 
were checked and met.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The main purpose of this paper was to investigate a set of 
hypotheses aimed at clarifying the relationship between EI 
and perceptions of trustworthiness. It was assumed that 
additional information would matter more than affect when 
people form perceptions at the later stage of a relationship 
From the additional findings, the result concerning the  
 
perception of benevolence indicated that there was a 
significant but negative correlation between EI and 
perception of benevolence due to the fact that some negative 
information was given. A negative correlation was found not 
only between the perception and overall EI, but also between 
the perception and all subcategories of EI, even though only 
one subcategory – ability to manage emotions - was 
moderately significant (Table 1). This result seemed to 
contradict previous results which have shown that 
supervisors rate high-EI subordinates as more altruistic than 
low-EI subordinates [39]. The difference, we argue, may lie 
in one of our experimental conditions, in which we 
deliberately added a somewhat selfish act. We try to 
reconcile the difference by making the following 
proposition: EI by itself is neutral and does not strengthen or 
diminish the perception of benevolence; rather it simply 
serves as an “amplifier” which amplifies later signals 
released from an individual. In other words, an individual 
can distinguish between high-EI and low-EI individuals but 
the distinction will affect one’s perception only after more 
information is available. This is supported by other findings 
revealing that a person’s charismatic behavior does not earn 
a person trust from others when he or she is a stranger [61]. 
On the one hand, when additional information signals 
benevolence, a trustor may perceive high-EI individuals as 
more benevolent than low-EI individuals. On the other hand, 
when additional signals do not indicate benevolence, a 
trustor may regard the high-EI individual as Machiavellian, 
which means the latter party is exploitative, and deceitful 
[62]. Previous findings have revealed that a negative 
relationship exists between trustworthiness and 
Machiavellianism [40, 63]. Moreover, those who score high 
in Machiavellianism are more likely to defect in a bargaining 
game [64].  
 There was also a moderately significant relationship 
found between perception of ability ratings and ability to 
understand emotions when additional negative information is 
present. This seemed logical in a sense since those who had 
better understanding of others’ emotions were regarded as 
having better ability than those who had not. 
 We summarize our findings as follows. Initially, EI does 
not contribute to any of the perceptions of trustworthiness. 
As more information is revealed, EI is likely to have an 
impact on the perception of benevolence but not on the 
perceptions of ability and integrity. The impact could be 
negative, provided that the nature of the information is 
negative. On the other hand, information alone has a 
significant impact on the perceptions of ability and integrity, 
but not on the perception of benevolence. 
Practical Implications 
 Our results have a number of practical implications. First, 
one of our results showed that a person’s EI has minimal 
impact on all the three perceptions of trustworthiness when a 
person is a complete stranger to another party. It implies that 
Table 2. Emotional intelligence as a predictor of benevolence perception under additional negative information. 
Regression Model Adjusted R2 F-value DF Beta t-value Significance 
Dependent variable: perception score of benevolence - - - - - - 
Emotional intelligence 0.512 12.524a 11 0.746 -3.539 0.005 
a Significant at p < 0.01 level. 
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substance is more important than style [61] even at the early 
stage of a relationship. In other words, only concrete 
evidence of trustworthiness can weaken others’ initial 
suspicions and entice their trust. For example, a subordinate 
will trust their supervisors’ abilities only when they show 
adequate technical knowledge rather than merely 
demonstrate confidence or enthusiasm. By the same token, 
one believes in others’ integrity only when incidents of 
word-action consistency are found. Even in the case of 
benevolence, the showing of empathy and concern may 
impress the trustees but will not immediately enhance others’ 
perceptions. Therefore, if a team wishes to establish a trust 
relationship with newcomers, showing track records of 
trustworthy acts might be more effective than mere 
demonstration of a warm and caring atmosphere. 
 Second, our results showed that people under uncertainty 
were highly sensitive to additional information in the case of 
trust based on ability or integrity, even when such 
information was not relevant to the judgment. It implies that 
it is better for a company to adopt a transparent policy than a 
black-box policy when its aim is to encourage trust. For 
example, when a company faces a redundancy decision, 
sometimes management teams might wish to keep the 
decision process in the dark or even engage in denial until 
the very last minute in an attempt to maintain morale. 
However, our result suggests that staff members who have 
not had well-established trust relationship with the 
management would try to surmise the authenticity of 
management’s words from clues such as rumors, and in 
many cases they may overreact to these clues. Eventually, 
good staff members whom the management wishes to retain 
may leave well before the announcement is made.  
 Third, our result also revealed that EI may, on some 
occasions, be detrimental in creating a trust relationship. It 
implies that management should not over-emphasize the 
importance of staff’s EI, especially in relation to the 
establishment of trust. A high-EI manager, for example, 
might be more skillful than a low-EI manager in displaying 
empathy towards his or her staff. Nonetheless, when such 
empathy is not matched with actions and behaviors, he or 
she will be perceived as less benevolent than a low-EI 
manager who acts in the same way. Of course, this does not 
imply that it is better for a company to employ a low-EI 
manager. It simply implies that when one considers trust-
building, one should first emphasize an individual’s 
creditability of ability, integrity and benevolence rather than 
an individual’s EI.  
Limitations 
 There were some limitations in our findings. First, one 
must be careful to generalize the results. Not all kinds of 
aspects within each perception have been taken into account 
in our experiment. In fact we took into account only one 
aspect for each perception. For example, in the perception of 
ability we considered ability that only involved little 
emotional content. For those abilities that comprise 
considerable emotional content, the effect of EI on the 
perception of ability might be more significant than our 
result showed. As the perception of ability is domain specific 
[41], it is simply not possible to test all kinds of abilities in a 
single experiment. Similarly for the perception of integrity 
we adopted material related only to honoring one’s promise 
but not to all principles that a trustor found acceptable. By 
the same token, the perception of benevolence was only 
related to whether a person would take advantage of another 
parties’ misfortune. 
 The second limitation concerns the face-to-face 
interaction we adopted in our experiment. Face-to-face 
interaction, some argue, offers less control than, for example, 
computer-mediated interaction. Although the latter can offer 
tight control by providing the same conditions across all 
assessors, it also severely limits an actor’s choices to respond 
to different assessors with different treatments, which he or 
she thinks best suit the individual assessor. The ability to 
make an appropriate choice of treatment is one of the key 
differences between a high-EI individual and a low-EI 
individual. High-EI individuals are regarded as better than 
low-EI individuals in affecting another party’s formation of 
perception through subtle demonstration of one’s own facial 
expression, tone or gestures. In order to keep this ability 
intact, we nonetheless chose face-to-face interaction. In fact, 
when Yamagishi [65] conducted an experiment by asking 
students to judge whether the other party would cooperate in 
a prisoners’ dilemma game, he allowed students to have a 
thirty-minute face-to-face discussion session in advance of 
the game. 
 The third limitation relates to the performances of actors 
and assessors. As each actor played ten to twelve games and 
each assessor played three games, it might be argued that 
actors’ performance could be affected by doing mundane 
tasks and assessors’ performance could be influenced by 
learning effects. While we could not rule out such 
influences, we took several actions to minimize the impact. 
First, each actor played only three to four games - normally 
different games - in a row with a break of ten to fifteen 
minutes inserted between different assessors. After three or 
four games, the actor would play against other assessors 
which took place ranging from an hour to a few days later. 
This arrangement was intended to minimize the boredom felt 
by actors. Second, each assessor played three games but not 
everyone played in the same sequence. The order was 
counterbalanced. By manipulating the sequence of playing, 
we averaged out the learning effects upon the results. 
Future Research 
 First, our results showed that EI might serve as an 
“amplifier” of information pertaining to benevolence. This 
needs to be investigated further as our experiment took into 
account information of negative nature only. Second, we 
found that EI offered negligible impact on perceptions of 
trustworthiness under uncertainty. However, it is still unclear 
whether such an impact remains trivial across the whole 
trust-building process. For example, Jones and George [15] 
have claimed that emotion serves as a signal that incites a 
reappraisal of a trust relationship and an emotional outburst 
will be likely to dissolve a trust bond. High-EI individuals 
might be better than low-EI individuals in consciously 
monitoring emotional signals so that the reach of the 
outburst point could be avoided. Therefore, future research 
that looks at the impact of EI on trust-building processes at 
different stages is recommended.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 We hypothesized that EI would be positively related to 
each of the perceptions of trust: ability, integrity and 
benevolence. Moreover, we hypothesized that all the 
perceptions would be significantly affected when additional 
information is revealed. However, our results showed that 
there was no significant relationship between an individual’s 
EI and his or her own trustworthiness in terms of ability, 
integrity and benevolence at the very early stage. On the 
contrary, we found people to be highly sensitive to additional 
clues about an individual’s trustworthiness in terms of ability 
and integrity, but not of benevolence. Additionally, our 
results pointed out that EI might even be counterproductive 
in benevolence-based trust if inconsistency between words 
and actions was present. 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 The authors confirm that this article content has no 
conflict of interest. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 Declared none. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Zeidner M, Matthews G, Roberts RD. Emotional intelligence, 
coping with stress, and adaptation. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas JP, 
Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional Intelligence in Everyday Life. New 
York: Psychology Press 2006; pp. 100-25. 
[2] Ciarrochi J, Blackledge JT. Mindfulness-based emotional 
intelligence training: A new approach to reducing human suffering 
and promoting effectiveness. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas JP, Mayer JD, 
Eds. Emotional intelligence in everyday life. New York: 
Psychology Press 2006; pp. 206-28. 
[3] Salovey P. Applied emotional intelligence: Regulating emotions to 
become healthy, wealthy and wise. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas JP, 
Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional intelligence in everyday life. New York: 
Psychology Press 2006; pp. 229-48. 
[4] Lopes PN, Salovey P, Straus R. Emotional intelligence, 
personality, and the perceived quality of social relationships. In: 
Salovey P, Brackett MA, Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional Intelligence: 
Key Readings on the Mayer and Salovey Model New York: Dude 
Publishing 2007; pp. 243-64. 
[5] Goleman D. Working with emotional intelligence. USA: Bantam 
1998. 
[6] George JM. Emotions and leadership: the role of emotional 
intelligence. Hum Relat 2000; 53: 1027-55. 
[7] Zhou J, George JM. Awakening employee creativity: the role of 
leader emotional intelligence. Leadership Quart 2003;14: 545-68. 
[8] Caruso DR, Bienn B, Kornacki SA. Emotional intelligence in the 
workplace. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas JP, Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional 
intelligence in everyday life. New York: Psychology Press 2006; 
pp. 187-205. 
[9] Tim S, Amanda K. Applied EI. The importance of attitudes in 
developing emotional intelligence. Chichester: Wiley 2006. 
[10] Cunningham JB, MacGregor J. Trust and the design of work 
complementary constructs in satisfaction and performance. Hum 
Relat 2000; 53: 1575-91. 
[11] Lines R, Selart M, Espedal B, Johansen ST. The production of trust 
during organizational change. J Chang Manag 2005; 5: 221-45. 
[12] Colquitt JA, Scott BA, LePine JA. Trust, trustworthiness, and trust 
propensity: a meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with 
risk taking and job performance. J Appl Psychol 2007; 92: 909-27. 
[13] McEvily B, Perrone V, Zaheer A. Trust as an organizing principle. 
Organ Sci 2003; 14: 91-103. 
[14] Heffernan T, O'Neill G, Travaglione T, Droulers M. Relationship 
marketing: the impact of emotional intelligence and trust on bank 
performance. IJBM 2008; 26: 183-99. 
[15] Jones GR, George JM. The experience and evolution of trust: 
Implications for cooperation and teamwork. Acad Manag Rev 
1998; 23: 531-46. 
[16] Dunn JR, Schweitzer ME. Feeling and believing: the influence of 
emotion on trust. J Person Soc Psychol 2005; 88: 736-48. 
[17] Lee W-S, Selart M. The impact of emotions on trust decisions. 
Handbook on Psychology of Decision-Making Hauppage, In: 
Moore KO and Gonzalez NP, Eds. USA: Nova Science Publishers 
2012. 
[18] Lee W-S, Selart M. The influence of emotions on trust in ethical 
decision making. Prob Perspect Manag 2014; 12: 573-80. 
[19] Druskat VU, Wolff SB. Building the emotional intelligence of 
groups. Harvard Bus Rev 2001; 79: 80-91. 
[20] Blau PM. Exchange and power in social life. USA: Transaction 
Publishers 1964. 
[21] Forgas JP. Mood and judgment: the affect infusion model (AIM). 
Psychol Bull 1995; 117: 39-66. 
[22] Whitener EM, Brodt SE, Korsgaard MA, Werner JM. Managers as 
initiators of trust: An exchange relationship framework for 
understanding managerial trustworthy behavior. Acad Manag Rev 
1998; 23: 513-30. 
[23] Johansen ST, Selart M, Grønhaug K. The effects of risk on initial 
trust formation. J Appl Soc Psychol 2013; 43: 1185-99. 
[24] Elfenbein HA, Ambady N. Predicting workplace outcomes from 
the ability to eavesdrop on feelings. J Appl Psychol 2002; 87: 963-
71. 
[25] Forgas JP, George JM. Affective influences on judgments and 
behavior in organizations: An information processing perspective. 
Organ Behav Hum Dec Process 2001; 86: 3-34. 
[26] Forgas JP, Wyland CL. Affective intelligence: understanding the 
role of affect in everyday social behavior. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas 
JP, Mayer JD, Eds. emotional intelligence in everyday life. New 
York: Psychology Press 2006; pp. 206-28. 
[27] Goleman D. Emotional intelligence: USA: Bantam 1995. 
[28] Greenberg PS, Greenberg RH, Antonucci YL. Creating and 
sustaining trust in virtual teams. Bus Horiz 2007; 50: 325-33. 
[29] Mayer JD, Salovey P. What is emotional intelligence? In: Salovey 
P, Brackett MA, Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional intelligence: key 
readings on the mayer and salovey model. New York: Dude 
Publishing 2007; pp. 243-64. 
[30] Bar-On R. Emotional and social intelligence: insights from 
emotional quotient inventory. In: Bar-On R, Parker JD, Eds. The 
handbook of emotional intelligence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
2000; pp. 363-88. 
[31] Goleman D. Leadership that gets results. Harvard Bus Rev 2000; 2: 
78-90. 
[32] Petrides KV, Pita R, Kokkinaki F. The location of trait emotional 
intelligence in personality factor space. Br J Psychol 2007; 98: 273-
89. 
[33] Brackett MA, Geher G. Measuring emotional intelligence: 
paradigmatic diversity and common ground. In: Ciarrochi J, Forgas 
JP, Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional intelligence in everyday life. New 
York: Psychology Press 2006; pp. 27-50. 
[34] Mayer JD, Salovey P, Caruso DR. Emotional intelligence: new 
ability or eclectic traits? Am Psychol 2008; 63: 503-17. 
[35] Zeidner M, Roberts RD, Matthews G. The science of emotional 
intelligence: current consensus and controversies. Eur Psychol 
2008; 13: 64-78. 
[36] Locke EA. Why emotional intelligence is an invalid concept. J 
Organ Behav 2005; 26: 425-31. 
[37] Day AL, Carroll SA. Faking emotional intelligence (EI): 
comparing response distortion on ability and trait?based EI 
measures. J Organ Behav 2008; 29: 761-84. 
[38] Cartwright S, Pappas C. Emotional intelligence, its measurement 
and implications for the workplace. Int J Manag Rev 2008; 10: 
149-71. 
[39] Carmeli A, Josman ZE. The relationship among emotional 
intelligence, task performance, and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Hum Perform 2006; 19: 403-19. 
[40] Butler JK. Toward understanding and measuring conditions of 
trust: evolution of a conditions of trust inventory. J Manag 1991; 
17: 643-63. 
[41] Mayer RC, Davis JH, Schoorman FD. An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Acad Manag Rev 1995; 20: 709-34. 
[42] Gill H, Boies K, Finegan JE, McNally J. Antecedents of trust: 
Establishing a boundary condition for the relation between 
170    The Open Psychology Journal, 2015, Volume 8 Lee and Selart 
propensity to trust and intention to trust. J Bus Psychol 2005; 19: 
287-302. 
[43] Mayer RC, Gavin MB. Trust in management and performance: 
who minds the shop while the employees watch the boss? Acad 
Manag J 2005; 48: 874-88. 
[44] Clark MC, Payne RL. Character?based determinants of trust in 
leaders. Risk Anal 2006; 26: 1161-73. 
[45] Lee B-C, Ang L, Dubelaar C. Lemons on the web: a signalling 
approach to the problem of trust in Internet commerce. J Econ 
Psychol 2005; 26: 607-23. 
[46] Konovsky MA, Pugh SD. Citizenship behavior and social 
exchange. Acad Manag J 1994; 37: 656-69. 
[47] Konovsky MA. Understanding procedural justice and its impact on 
business organizations. J Manag 2000; 26: 489-511. 
[48] Selart M. A leadership perspective on decision making. Oslo: 
Cappelen Academic Publishers 2010. 
[49] Elsbach KD. Managing images of trustworthiness in organizations. 
In: Kramer RM, Cook KS, Eds. Trust and distrust in organizations 
dilemmas and approaches. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
2004; pp. 65-98. 
[50] Cook KS, Kramer RM, Thom DH, Stepanikova I, Mollborn SB, 
Cooper RM. Trust and distrust in patient-physician relationships: 
Perceived determinants of high- and low- trust relationships in 
managed-care settings. In: Kramer RM, Cook KS, Eds. Trust and 
distrust in organizations dilemmas and approaches. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation 2004; pp. 65-98. 
[51] Lee DY, Uhlemann MR, Haase RF. Counselor verbal and 
nonverbal responses and perceived expertness, trustworthiness, and 
attractiveness. J Couns Psychol 1985; 32: 181-7. 
[52] Fretz BR, Corn R, Tuemmler JM, Bellet W. Counselor nonverbal 
behaviors and client evaluations. . J Couns Psychol 1979; 26: 304-
11. 
[53] McKnight DH, Cummings LL, Chervany NL. Initial trust 
formation in new organizational relationships. Acad Manag Rev 
1998; 23: 473-90. 
[54] Mayer JD, Salovey P, Caruso DR. Mayer-Salovey-Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). New York: Multi-Health 
Systems Inc. 2002. 
[55] Clark MC, Payne RL. The nature and structure of workers' trust in 
management. J Organ Behav 1997; 18: 205-24. 
[56] McKnight DH, Chervany NL. Reflections on an initial trust-
building model. USA: Edward Elgar 2006; 29-51. 
[57] Olivero N, Lunt P. Privacy versus willingness to disclose in e-
commerce exchanges: the effect of risk awareness on the relative 
role of trust and control. J Econ Psychol 2004; 25: 243-62. 
[58] Johnson D, Grayson K. Cognitive and affective trust in service 
relationships. J Bus Res 2005; 58: 500-7. 
[59] Schutte NS, Malouff JM, Bobik C, et al. Emotional intelligence 
and interpersonal relations. J Soc Psychol 2001; 141: 523-36. 
[60] Mayer JD, Caruso DR, Salovey P. Emotional intelligence meets 
traditional standards for an intelligence. In: Salovey P, Brackett 
MA, Mayer JD, Eds. Emotional intelligence: key readings on the 
Mayer and Salovey Model. New York: Dude Publishing 2007; pp. 
123-60. 
[61] Kirkpatrick SA, Locke EA. Direct and indirect effects of three core 
charismatic leadership components on performance and attitudes. J 
Appl Psychol 1996; 81: 36-51. 
[62] Hunter JE, Gerbing DW, Boster FJ. Machiavellian beliefs and 
personality: construct invalidity of the Machiavellianism 
dimension. J Person Soc Psychol 1982; 43: 1293-305. 
[63] Butler Jr JK. Reciprocity of dyadic trust in close male-female 
relationships. J Soc Psychol 1986; 126: 579-91. 
[64] Gunnthorsdottir A, McCabe K, Smith V. Using the 
Machiavellianism instrument to predict trustworthiness in a 
bargaining game. J Econ Psychol 2002; 23: 49-66. 
[65] Yamagishi T. Trust as a form of social intelligence. In: Cook KS, 
Ed. Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 2001; 
pp. 121-74. 
 
 
Received: August 17, 2015 Revised: September 06, 2015 Accepted: September 06, 2015 
 
© Lee and Selart; Licensee Bentham Open. 
 
This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode), which permits unrestricted, non-
commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited. 
 
